Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Senate
Congress of the Philippines
Senate
SITTING AS THE IMPEACHMENT COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF RENATO C. CORONA AS CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Case No. 002-2011
Case No. 002-2011
REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, LORENZO R. TAÑADA III,
REYNALDO V. UMALI, ARLENE J. BAG-AO (other complainants comprising at
least one third (1/3) of the total Members of the House or
Representatives as are indicated below.)
x—————————————————————–x
ANSWER
[TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT, 12 DECEMBER 2011]
[TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT, 12 DECEMBER 2011]
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, through his undersigned counsel, most respectfully states:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
The sin of Pontius Pilate is not that he exercised his powers, but
that he abandoned his judgment, washed his hands and let the angry mob
have its way.
1. Impeachment, for Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (“CJ Corona”),
came like a thief in the night. Even as he stands before this Tribunal
to defend himself, his greatest fear is the danger that lady justice
herself must face.
2. In blitzkrieg fashion, 188 Members of the House of Representatives signed the Articles of Impeachment,
causing the immediate transmission of the complaint to the Senate.
Almost instantly, some Members the of House resigned from the majority
coalition, amidst complaints of undue haste in the filing of the
Articles of Impeachment. It appears that Members were expected to sign
on being offered tangible rewards, even if denied the opportunity to
read the Articles of Impeachment and examine the evidence against CJ
Corona.
3. The nation remains in a state of bewilderment, stunned to see
that the members of the House of Representatives were able to come
together on such short notice, to decisively act on a matter that they
had no knowledge of the week before! To this day, the public’s
proverbial mind is muddled with questions about the fate of the
so-called priority bills long covered with mildew and buried in cobwebs.
While the swift impeachment action of the House of Representative is
nothing short of miraculous, it also has the distinction of being the
single most destructive legislative act heretofore seen.
4. A fair assessment of the prevailing political climate will
support the contention that the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
was the handiwork of the Liberal Party alone. Surely, one cannot ignore
the inexplicable readiness of the Members of the House to instantly
agree to sign the Articles of Impeachment. Without much effort, one
reaches the inevitable conclusion that President Benigno C. Aquino III
as, the head of the Liberal Party, must have been “in” on the plan from
inception. In contrast, it is unlikely that President Aquino knew nothing of the plans to impeach the Chief Justice.
5. There is little doubt about the desirability of having a
friendly, even compliant, Supreme Court as an ally. Any president, Mr.
Aquino included, hopes for a Supreme Court that consistently rules in
his favor. Ensuring political advantage would amply justify the
allegation that President Aquino seeks to subjugate the Supreme Court.
More importantly, however, many circumstances and events dating back to
the election of President Aquino support the conclusion that it was he
who desired to appoint the Chief Justice and who instigated and ordered
the filing of impeachment charges to remove Chief Justice Corona.
6. Even before assuming office, President Aquino was predisposed to rejecting the appointment of CJ Corona, viz.:
* * Aquino had said he does not want to take his oath of office before Corona.
At the very least I think his appointment will be questioned at some
future time. Those who chose to side with the opinion that the president
cannot appoint also excused themselves from nomination. At the end of
the day I do not want to start out with any questions upon assumption of
office, Aquino said.
7. Indeed, when the time came for President-elect Aquino to take his oath, he opted to do so before Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales. And, though Chief Justice Corona was among the guests at his inauguration, as dictated by protocol, the President snubbed him.
8. On 1 December 2011, at an address before foreign investors,
President Aquino – in reference to Dinagat Island Cases and the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order allowing GMA to exercise her right to
travel abroad – called the Supreme Court and its Members “confused” for
derailing his administration’s mandate. The most virulent attack from
the President came on 5 December 2011, when President Aquino openly
attacked CJ Corona at his infamous address during the National Criminal
Justice Summit, deriding the appointment of the Chief Justice and
calling it a violation of the Constitution. These speeches followed on
the heels of the promulgation of the decision in Hacienda Luisita,
Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., where the
Supreme Court ordered the distribution of the lands of the Hacienda
owned by President Aquino’s family, to the farmer beneficiaries. As if
on cue, after the President’s speeches, that members of the House of
Representatives adopted signed the Articles of Impeachment against CJ
Corona.
9. What we have before us, then, is a Complaint born out of the
bias against CJ Corona and the predisposition to destroy him by
associating him with the unpopular former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and by misinterpreting his concurrence to certain Supreme Court
decisions as protecting former President Arroyo. What we also have are
hidden forces who will be benefited by CJ Corona’s ouster and who are
conspiring and causing intrigue behind the scene to ensure his removal
and their re-emergence into power to the detriment of the Bench, Bar and
the populace. Certainly, such cannot be the backdrop, purpose and
consequence of impeachment.
10. The impeachment process – while admittedly political in
character – has therefore become a partisan orgy, devoid of any mature
deliberation and of lawful purpose whatsoever, especially in a
precedent-setting and historic event involving no less than the
impeachment of the Chief Justice of the Philippines. When impeachment
results from a rushed, partisan and insidious attempt to unseat a
sitting Chief Justice, instead of a rational and careful debate on the
merits of the Articles of Impeachment, the arbitrariness of such an act
comes to the fore, taints the process and amounts to an unveiled threat
against the other justices of the Supreme Court.
11. The past events depict an Executive Branch that is unwilling
to brook any opposition to its power, particularly in prosecuting high
officials of the former Administration. When the Chief Justice took his
solemn oath to uphold the law and dispense justice without fear or
favor, that oath did not carve an exception with respect to actions of
the President of the Philippines.
After all, the Rule of Law is not the rule of the President. As
landmark jurisprudence puts it, it is the province of the Supreme Court
to say that what the law is. When the Supreme Court decides a case, it
is a collective decision of the Court. It is not a decision of the
Chief Justice alone.
12. The noble purpose of impeachment is to spare the nation from
the scourge of an undesirable public official who wields power in
disregard of the constitutional order. It is a drastic appeal to
restore respect for the sovereignty of the people. Tragically, the
Verified Impeachment Complaint is not such a noble impeachment of Chief
Justice Corona; facially, it is a challenge to certain orders and
decisions of the Supreme Court, misperceived as an effrontery to
Executive and Legislative privileges. In reality, however, this
impeachment seeks mainly to oust CJ Corona and such number of justices
that will not bend to the powerful and popular chief executive.
13. This intemperate demonstration of political might is a fatal
assault on the independent exercise of judicial power. Falsely branded
as an attempt at checks and balances – and even accountability – we are
witnessing a callous corruption of our democracy in this staged
impeachment. Never in the history of this nation has the Republican
system of Government under the Constitution been threatened in such
cavalier fashion. Chief Justice Corona bears the happenstance of
leading the Supreme Court in the face of a political crusade that
readily sacrifices the Rule of Law to its thirst for popularity.
14. The impeachment of CJ Corona is thus a bold, albeit
ill-advised attempt by the Executive Branch (with the help of allies in
the House of Representatives) to mold an obedient Supreme Court. The
fundamental issue before this hallowed body transcends the person of the
Chief Justice. What is at stake then is the independence of the
Supreme Court and the Judiciary as a whole. Because the impeachment of
Chief Justice Corona is an assault on the independence of the Judiciary,
it is nothing less than an attack on the Constitution itself.
15. Our constitutional system – with its bedrock principles of
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances – simply cannot survive
without a robust and independent Judiciary. An independent Supreme
Court and Judiciary, which is an essential foundation of our democratic
system of government, cannot be allowed to dissolve into hollow words
from its fragile living reality.
16. The Senate of the Philippines – whose own history of
independence has kept the Nation in good stead – is now called upon to
protect the Judiciary’s independence under the Constitution and save the
Nation from the abyss of unchecked Executive power. In these
proceedings, the responsibility of protecting the Judiciary belongs to
the Senate. Only through a fair and judicious exercise of its judgment
can the Senate restore productive co-existence within the trinity of the
Republic’s 3 great branches.
17. Fortunately, the experience of challenges to judicial independence of other democracies may prove enlightening:
No matter how angry and frustrated either of the other branches may be by the action of the Supreme Court, removal of individual members of the Court because of their judicial philosophy is not permissible. The other branches must make use of other powers granted them by the Constitution in their effort to bring the Court to book.
No matter how angry and frustrated either of the other branches may be by the action of the Supreme Court, removal of individual members of the Court because of their judicial philosophy is not permissible. The other branches must make use of other powers granted them by the Constitution in their effort to bring the Court to book.
18. In these proceedings, attention will therefore be repeatedly
drawn to certain general principles central to a correct resolution of
the issues. The most fundamental of these principles is the rule that a
man is responsible only for the natural, logical consequences of his
acts. Conversely, a man cannot be held responsible for that which is not
his doing. The related rule of parity provides that there must be
identical consequences for identical acts, and to punish one for his
acts, but not another, is to have no law at all.
19. It bears stressing that these general principles are not
technical rules of law, but are rules drawn honored by the long
experience of usage in civilized society; honored not by force of law,
but because of their inherent logic and unquestionable fairness, proving
themselves able to render satisfactory resolution in countless
situations, again and again. These rules emanate not so much from the
exercise of legislative power, but from an inherent sense of justice
that each individual understands.
20. These are the principles and rules that favor the case of
Chief Justice Corona. Be that as it may, unless this august Senate heeds
his pleas for justice and reason and lends its protective intercession
against a determined executive, Chief Justice Corona could well be the
last defender of judicial independence. After him, there may be nothing
left to protect.
21. In this battle for the preservation of our democracy, CJ
Corona draws courage and impetus from the words of the eminent
constitutionalist, Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. –
In this critical moment of our constitutional history, my hope is that the justices of the Supreme Court, imperfect though they may be, will not capitulate and that others in the judiciary will not tremble in their boots and yield what is constitutionally theirs to the President. If they do, it would be tragic for our nation.
In this critical moment of our constitutional history, my hope is that the justices of the Supreme Court, imperfect though they may be, will not capitulate and that others in the judiciary will not tremble in their boots and yield what is constitutionally theirs to the President. If they do, it would be tragic for our nation.
ADMISSIONS
1. CJ Corona, only insofar as the same are consistent with this
Answer, admits the allegations in the Verified Complaint for Impeachment
dated 12 December 2011 (“the Complaint”) regarding the identities and
circumstances of “The Parties,” his appointment as stated in paragraph
3.1 and qualifies the admission by declaring that he rendered service as
an officer of the Offices of the Vice President and President, and not
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA).
2. CJ Corona further admits par. 3.5.3 of the Complaint with the
qualification that he granted the request for a courtesy call only to
Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC). However, Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez at the
appointed time, without prior permission or invitation.
3. With respect to par. 7.6, CJ Corona admits the same but takes
exception to the allegation that there is a pre-condition to the
temporary restraining order referred to therein.
4. Furthermore, CJ Corona admits paragraphs 1.1, 2.1, 3.2, 3.3.5,
3.3.6, 3.4.6, 3.5.1, 3.5.7, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, and 6.2, only as to the
existence of the constitutional provisions, decisions, resolutions,
orders and proceedings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cited in
these paragraphs.
DENIALS
1. CJ Corona denies the following:
2. All the paragraphs under “Prefatory Statement,” for being mere
conclusions, conjecture or opinions, without basis in fact and law.
3. Certain paragraphs under “General Allegations” –
4. The first and second paragraphs, the truth being that the
legality of the appointment of CJ Corona was passed upon and decided by
the Supreme Court En Banc in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et
al. and consolidated petitions, the merits of which are not the subject
of a review before this Impeachment Court.
5. The third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth paragraphs, for
being mere opinions or conjectures, without basis in fact and in law.
6. The sixth paragraph, for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief over the alleged matters, irrelevant to
these proceedings.
7. All of the “Grounds for Impeachment,” the “Discussion of the
Grounds for Impeachment,” specifically paragraphs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5,
1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4,
3.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.4, 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4, 3.4.5,
3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.4.9, 3.4.10, 3.5, 3.5.2, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.6, 3.5.8,
3.5.9, 3.5.10, 3.5.11, 3.6, 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5, 4.2,
4.3, 4.4, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13,
5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.7, 7.8,
7.9, 7.10, 7.11, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, the truth being as discussed
hereunder.
DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC DENIALS
AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
1. The Complaint is insufficient in substance and form.
2. The Constitution requires that the House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
This Complaint was filed pursuant to Section 3(4) of Article XI, which
provides:
Sec. 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
is filed by at least one-third of all the members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
3. The Impeachment Court may not proceed to trial on the basis of
this Complaint because it is constitutionally infirm and defective, for
failure to comply with the requirement of verification. Attention is
called to the Verification of the Complaint which states that each of
the signatories “read the contents thereof.”
4. Undoubtedly, public admissions by members of the House of
Representatives declared that there was no opportunity to read the
Complaint. They also declared that the majority of signatories signed
without reading the Complaint, but reputably in exchange for material
considerations. It stands to reason that the House of Representatives
had no authority under the Constitution to transmit the Articles of
Impeachment for trial before the Senate.
5. Under Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge
and based on authentic records. In this case, however, the requirement
of verification is not a mere procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement. In other words, failure to meet the requirement renders
the impeachment of CJ Corona unconstitutional.
6. Section 3(4) of Article XI of the Constitution further requires
that the verified Complaint is filed by at least one-third of all
members of the House. In direct violation of this provision, the
Complaint was initiated by President Aquino, and filed by his
sub-alterns. Accordingly, the complaint could not be directly
transmitted to the Senate.
7. CJ Corona adopts and repleads the Prefatory Statement.
8. It is an extremely rare event when the present House of
Representatives instantly musters 188 votes for any matter pending
before it, including those described as urgent legislation. Surely, the
blitzkrieg adoption of the Complaint was only possible by the
indispensable concerted action of the majority coalition, dominated by
the Liberal Party headed by President Aquino.
9. In consideration of the available evidence, CJ Corona reserves
his right to request for compulsory processes to elicit and adduce
evidence on his behalf regarding matters indispensable for the
resolution of this case.
ARTICLE I
Alleged Partiality to the GMA Administration
Alleged Partiality to the GMA Administration
1. CJ Corona denies Article I.
2. CJ Corona specifically denies pars.1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6,
1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, in so far as these allege and
insinuate that CJ Corona betrayed public trust when he supposedly showed
partiality and subservience to protect or favor his alleged benefactor
or patroness, GMA and her family, by shamelessly accepting his midnight
appointment as Chief Justice.
3. To begin with, Complainants do not define “betrayal of public
trust” as a ground for impeachment. Betrayal of public trust in the
impeachment of a responsible constitutional officer is not a catch-all
phrase to cover every misdeed committed. As a ground for impeachment,
betrayal of public trust must be at the same level of committing treason
and bribery or offenses that strike at the very heart of the life of
the nation. Betrayal of public trust should be limited to grave
violations of the most serious nature, lest impeachable officers fall
prey to all sorts of frivolous charges.
4. Further, the nature of the office of constitutionally-tenured
government officials, like the Chief Justice, requires that they remain
independent and insulated from political pressures. The right to be
removed only by impeachment is the Constitution’s strongest guarantee of
security of tenure and independence. Otherwise, impeachable officers
will be vulnerable to scheming individuals concocting sham impeachment
charges to accomplish their selfish agendas.
5. By mentioning the decisions and actions of the Supreme Court in
paragraphs 1.2, 1.6, 1,7, 1.11, 1.14, and 1.15, Complainants
demonstrate their lack of understanding of the concept of a collegial
body like the Supreme Court, where each member has a single vote.
Whether he be the Chief Justice or the most junior associate, his vote
is of equal weight with that of the others.
6. Unlike the Chief Justice, the President of the Philippines has
control “of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.” This
means that he has the power to reverse, or “alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.”
7. The authority of the Chief Justice is like that of the Senate
President with respect to laws voted for approval. They both cast just
one vote, equal to the vote of every member of the body. The Chief
Justice has no control over any Justice of the Supreme Court. The
decision of the Supreme Court, either by division or en banc, is a
result of the deliberative process and voting among the Justices. Each
Justice has the prerogative to write and voice his separate or
dissenting opinion. A concurrence of the majority, however, is needed to
decide any case.
8. It must be emphasized that CJ Corona cannot be held accountable
for the outcome of cases before the Supreme Court which acts as a
collegial tribunal. This is the essence of the system of justice before
the Supreme Court, as mandated by the Constitution. In In Re: Almacen,
the Court through Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro elucidated on the
nature of a collegial court:
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members
thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts
as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of
its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a
duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not
the individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose
rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.” (Emphasis
supplied) [See also Bautista vs. Abdulwahid and Santiago vs. Enriquez.]
9. In effect, the Complaint calls upon the Impeachment Court to
review certain decisions of the Supreme Court. This cannot be done; it
is beyond any reasonable debate. It is an essential feature of the
checks and balances in a republican form of government that no other
department may pass upon judgments of the Supreme Court. This is the
principle of separation of powers. According to Maglasang v. People:
We further note that in filing the “complaint” against the justices
of the Court’s Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our
government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty.
Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all
and sundry that “the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great
department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power
to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or
declare them ‘unjust.’” Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not
even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass
judgment on any of the Court’s acts.” (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) [See also In Re: Laureta and In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo. Ex
Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].
10. Complainants allege in par. 1.2 that CJ Corona betrayed public
trust when he shamelessly accepted his “midnight appointment” as Chief
Justice. As already stated, his was not a midnight appointment
prohibited by the Constitution. To repeat, this issue was settled by
the Supreme Court in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.:
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department,
and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in
Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the
duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others.
Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In
particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list
of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
11. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other
appointments in the Judiciary. One of the reasons underlying the
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight
appointments by an outgoing Chief Executive, as contemplated in Aytona
v. Castillo. HYPERLINK
“http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm” \l
“_ftn75″ \o “” In fact, in In Re: Valenzuela that Complainants invoke,
the Court observed that the outgoing President may make appointments to
important positions even after the proclamation of the new President,
if they are the result of deliberate actions and careful considerations:
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be
appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they
are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing President.
Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were
shown to have been well considered, were upheld. (Emphasis supplied)
12. Concretely, Complainants ignored the most crucial ruling in In
re: Valenzuela, where the Supreme Court – as early as 1998 – already
contemplated a situation similar to that of CJ Corona, viz:
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an
appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but
also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership
of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum or should the
voting on a particular important questions requiring expeditious
resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by
neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4(1) and 9 of Article
VIII. (Emphasis supplied)
13. Complainants allege in pars. 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 1.10,
1.11, 1.12, 1.13, 1.14 and 1.15 that CJ Corona’s vote in decisions
affecting GMA constitute betrayal of public trust. Notably, CJ Corona
did not pen those decisions. He only either concurred or dissented in
them. Actually, Complainants’ own table shows this. He never
flip-flopped or changed his vote in any of the cases mentioned.
14. Complainants cite Newsbreak’s table of Supreme Court cases
involving GMA’s administration, its rulings, and the CJ Corona’s votes
as proof of his partiality and subservience to her. Newsbreak’s own
table shows, however, that CJ Corona’s votes were not consistently
pro-GMA. Although he voted for her policies in 78% of the cases, he
voted against her in 22% of those cases. This negates any allegation of
subservience, partiality and bias against CJ Corona.
15. In their article Judicial Politics in Unstable Democracies:
The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court, an Empirical Analysis 1986-
2010, authors Laarni Escresa and Nuno Garoupa tracked 125 decisions of
the Supreme Court in politically-salient cases from 1986 to 2010. The
article pointed out that Justice Antonio Carpio who served as GMA’s
Chief Presidential Legal Adviser cast 19 pro-administration votes as
against 11 anti-administration votes or around 66% pro-GMA votes.
Justice Arturo Brion, who served as GMA’s Labor Secretary cast 5
pro-administration votes against 8 anti-administration votes or around
33% pro-GMA votes. Actually, CJ Corona in this study cast 8
pro-administration votes against 28 anti-administration votes or around
only 29% pro-GMA votes.
16. Contrasted with the alleged statistics from the Newsbreak
table adverted to, the data of Escresa and Garoupa reveals that no
conclusive evidence exists to support the allegations of Complainants.
17. Complainants also allege in par. 1.6 that CJ Corona thwarted
the creation of the Truth Commission in the Biraogo case thus shielding
GMA from investigation and prosecution. To be sure, the Justices of the
Court tangled with each other in a spirited debate and submitted their
concurring and dissenting opinions. Under the circumstances, CJ Corona
could neither have directed nor influenced the votes of his colleagues.
Complainants insult the intelligence and independence of the other
members of the Supreme Court by their illogical claim.
18. CJ Corona denies the allegations in pars. 1.7 and 1.8, that he
caused the issuance of the status quo ante order (SQAO) in
Dianalan-Lucman v. Executive Secretary, involving President Aquino’s
Executive Order No. 2 that placed Dianalan-Lucman in the class of GMA’s
midnight appointees. Although the Supreme Court did not enjoin the
removal of other appointees, it issued a SQAO in favor of
Dianalan-Lucman because of her unique situation. As usual, CJ Corona
cast just one vote in the Supreme Court’s unanimous action.
19. Again, CJ Corona denies the allegations in pars. 1.11, 1.12
and 1.13, that he should have recused from Aquino v. Commission on
Elections. The Rules of Court specify the grounds for inhibition or
recusal. CJ Corona had no reason to inhibit himself from the case. None
of the grounds in either the Rules of Court or the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court apply to him in the particular case.
20. Besides, it is not uncommon for Justices to have previously
worked as professionals in close association with the President. A
number of notable examples are:
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT
POSITION PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT IN SC
Jose Abad Santos
Quezon
Secretary, DOJ
Delfin Jaranilla
Osmena
Secretary, DOJ
Jesus G. Barrera
Garcia
Secretary, DOJ
Calixto Zaldivar
Macapagal
Asst. Executive Sec then Acting Executive Sec
Claudio Teehankee
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Vicente Abad Santos
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Enrique Fernando
Marcos
Presidential Legal Counsel
Felix V. Makasiar
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Pedro Yap
Aquino
Commissioner, PCGG
Leonardo Quisumbing
Ramos
Secretary, DOLE
Antonio Eduardo Nachura
GMA
Presidential Legal Counsel
APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT
POSITION PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT IN SC
Jose Abad Santos
Quezon
Secretary, DOJ
Delfin Jaranilla
Osmena
Secretary, DOJ
Jesus G. Barrera
Garcia
Secretary, DOJ
Calixto Zaldivar
Macapagal
Asst. Executive Sec then Acting Executive Sec
Claudio Teehankee
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Vicente Abad Santos
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Enrique Fernando
Marcos
Presidential Legal Counsel
Felix V. Makasiar
Marcos
Secretary, DOJ
Pedro Yap
Aquino
Commissioner, PCGG
Leonardo Quisumbing
Ramos
Secretary, DOLE
Antonio Eduardo Nachura
GMA
Presidential Legal Counsel
21. Incidentally, Justice Antonio Carpio, whom GMA appointed to
the Supreme Court, was a partner in the law firm that used to be the
retained counsel of her family.
22. None of the above appointees inhibited from the cases
involving the policies of the Presidents they previously worked with.
Their ties with the appointing power were official. When they took
their oaths, they swore to discharge faithfully the duties of their new
offices.
23. Long standing is the rule that previous service to the
government cannot suffice to cause the inhibition of a justice from
hearing cases of the government before the Supreme Court. To compel the
Justice to inhibit or recuse amounts to violating his security of tenure
and amounts to an attack on the independence of the judiciary. In
Vargas v. Rilloraza, the Supreme Court struck down an attempt to
forcibly disqualify certain Justices from sitting and voting in
government cases for the very reason that they were once employed or
held office in the Philipine Government, viz:
But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court “who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic” would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office or position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the People’s Court Act would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer case of repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.
But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court “who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic” would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office or position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the People’s Court Act would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer case of repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.
For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an
actual removal of the disqualified Justice from his office for, as above
demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would
have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced
Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties
appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or disqualification
under Rule 126. What matters here is not only that the Justice affected
continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments as
well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the other duties of his
office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and
fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly
coming before his Court under the constitution, again without prejudice
to proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126. Any statute enacted
by the legislature which would impede him in this regard, in the words
of this Court in In re Guariña, supra, citing Marbury vs. Madison,
supra, “simply can not become law.”
It goes without saying that, whether the matter of disqualification
of judicial officers belong to the realm of adjective, or to that of
substantive law, whatever modifications, change or innovation the
legislature may propose to introduce therein, must not in any way
contravene the provisions of the constitution, nor be repugnant to the
genius of the governmental system established thereby. The tripartite
system, the mutual independence of the three departments — in
particular, the independence of the judiciary —, the scheme of checks
and balances, are commonplaces in democratic governments like this
Republic. No legislation may be allowed which would destroy or tend to
destroy any of them.
Under Article VIII, section 2 (4) of the Constitution the Supreme
Court may not be deprived of its appellate jurisdiction, among others,
over those criminal cases where the penalty may be death or life
imprisonment. Pursuant to Article VIII, sections 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the
Constitution the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be exercised
by the Chief Justice with the consent of the Commission of
Appointments, sitting in banc or in division, and in cases like those
involving treason they must sit in banc. If according to section 4 of
said Article VIII, “the Supreme Court shall be composed” of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its jurisdiction can
only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of these
constitutional component members of the Court — particularly, as in the
instant case, a majority of them — is nothing short of pro tanto
depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his
judicial power. (Diehl vs. Crumb, 72 Okl., 108; 179 Pac., 44). And if
that judge is the one designated by the constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this
Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to
the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It would seem
evident that if the Congress could disqualify members of this Court to
take part in the hearing and determination of certain collaboration
cases it could extend the disqualification to other cases. The question
is not one of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE II
Alleged Non-disclosure of Declaration
of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth
Alleged Non-disclosure of Declaration
of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth
1. CJ Corona denies Article II.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 that CJ Corona
committed a culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed
public trust by failing to disclose his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) as the Constitution provides. CJ
Corona has no legal duty to disclose his SALN. Complainants have cited
none.
3. Actually, what the Constitution provides is that a public
officer shall, upon assumption of office and as often as may be required
by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth. Implementing this policy, R.A. 6713, the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, imposes on
public officials the obligation to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests.
4. Clearly, what the Constitution and the law require is the
accomplishment and submission of their SALNs. CJ Corona has faithfully
complied with this requirement every year. From that point, it is the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court who has custody over his declaration
of assets, liabilities, and net worth.
5. R.A. 6713 recognizes the public’s right to know the assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests of public
officials but subject to limitations provided in Section 8 thereof:
(D) Prohibited acts. – It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
6. In 1989, Jose Alejandrino, a litigant, requested the Clerk of
Court for the SALNs of members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
decision that reduced the P2.4 million damages awarded to him by the
trial court to only P100,000.00 in a breach of contract case. In an en
banc resolution of 2 May 1989, the Supreme Court expressed willingness
to have the Clerk of Court furnish copies of the SALNs of the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices to any person upon request, provided
there is a legitimate reason for the request, it being in fact unlawful
for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under R.A. 6713 for
any purpose contrary to morals or public policy, or any commercial
purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to
the general public.
7. Further, the Supreme Court noted that requests for copies of
SALNs of justices and judges could endanger, diminish, or destroy their
independence and objectivity or expose them to revenge, kidnapping,
extortion, blackmail, or other dire fates. For this reason, the Supreme
Court resolved in 1989 to lay down the following guidelines for
considering requests for the SALNs of justices, judges, and court
personnel:
(1) All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities
shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the case
of any Justice; or with the Court Administrator, in the case of any
Judge, and shall state the purpose of the request.
(2) The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as
important as the right to information which is subject to the
limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for
the fair and just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be
wary of deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be
freely available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a
litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the
court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter
will come before it under circumstances from which it may, also
reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good faith and
for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, with the
implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn
the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the
request may be denied. (Emphasis supplied)
(3) Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the
person making the request and the request for information appears to be a
“fishing expedition” intended to harass or get back at the Judge, the
request may be denied.
(4) In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or
where the nature of their work exposes judges to assaults against their
personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be
immediately reported to the military
(5) The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.
8. The Supreme Court reiterated and strengthened this policy in a
resolution three years later. In 1992, the Supreme Court denied the
request of a Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
and a military captain for certified true copies of the sworn statements
of the assets, liabilities, and net worth of two judges, it appearing
that the intention was “to fish for information” against the judges.
9. At any rate, CJ Corona has not prevented the public disclosure
of his declarations of assets, liabilities, and networth. Firstly, it
is not for the Chief Justice to unilaterally decide whether to disclose
or not to disclose them. Secondly, the release of the SALNs of Justices
is regulated by law and the Court’s various Resolutions cited above.
Thirdly, CJ Corona never issued an order that forbids the public
disclosure of his above declarations.
10. In pars. 2.3 and 2.4, Complainants suspect and accuse CJ
Corona of betrayal of public trust because he allegedly accumulated
ill-gotten wealth, acquired high-value assets, and kept bank accounts
with huge deposits, not declared in his SALN.
11. The allegations are conjectural and speculative. They do not
amount to a concrete statement of fact that might require a denial.
Accusations in general terms such as these have no place in pleadings,
as they bring only hearsay and rumor into the body of evidence involved.
At any rate, the allegations are flatly denied. The truth of the matter
is that CJ Corona acquired his assets from legitimate sources of
income, mostly from his professional toils.
12. Finally, Complainants allege in par. 2.4 that “reports” state
CJ Corona acquired a 300-sq. m. apartment in the Fort, Taguig.
Complainants speculate that he has not reported this in his SALN and
that its price is beyond his income as a public official. CJ Corona
admits that he and his wife purchased on installment a 300-sq. m.
apartment in Taguig, declared in his SALN when they acquired it.
ARTICLE III
Alleged Lack of Competence, Integrity,
Probity, and Independence
Alleged Lack of Competence, Integrity,
Probity, and Independence
1. CJ Corona denies Article III.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and
3.3.4, that CJ Corona allowed the Supreme Court to act on mere letters
from a counsel in Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines (PAL), resulting in
flip-flopping decisions in the case. Complainants say that the Court
did not even require FASAP to comment on those letters of PAL’s counsel,
Atty. Estelito Mendoza, betraying CJ Corona’s lack of ethical
principles and disdain for fairness.
3. Firstly, lawyers and litigants often write the Supreme Court or
the Chief Justice regarding their cases. The Supreme Court uniformly
treats all such letters as official communications that it must act on
when warranted. The practice is that all letters are endorsed to the
proper division or the Supreme Court en banc in which their subject
matters are pending. No letter to the Supreme Court is treated in
secret.
4. Secondly, CJ Corona took no part in the FASAP Case, having inhibited since 2008.
5. Thirdly, Atty. Mendoza wrote the letters to the Clerk of Court
about a perceived mistake in raffling the FASAP Case to the Second
Division following the retirement of Justice Nachura. Since the Second
Division Justices could not agree on the reassignment of this case, it
referred the matter to the Supreme Court en banc pursuant to the
Internal Rules.
6. After deliberation, the Supreme Court en banc accepted the
referral from the Second Division and proceeded to act on the case. CJ
Corona did not take part in the case.
7. Complainants also allege in par. 3.3.3 that the Supreme Court
also flip-flopped in its decisions in League of Cities v. COMELEC. It
is unfair, however, to impute this to CJ Corona. As stated earlier, the
Supreme Court is a collegial body and its actions depend on the
consensus among its members. Although the Chief Justice heads that body,
he is entitled to only one vote in the fifteen-member Supreme Court.
8. Besides, the changing decisions of the Supreme Court in League
of Cities can hardly be considered as flip-flopping of votes. Justice
Roberto A. Abad demonstrated this in his concurring opinion, thus:
One. The Justices did not decide to change their minds on a mere
whim. The two sides filed motions for reconsideration in the case and
the Justices had no options, considering their divided views, but to
perform their duties and vote on the same on the dates the matters came
up for resolution.
The Court is no orchestra with its members playing one tune under the
baton of a maestro. They bring with them a diversity of views, which
is what the Constitution prizes, for it is this diversity that filters
out blind or dictated conformity.
Two. Of twenty-three Justices who voted in the case at any of its
various stages, twenty Justices stood by their original positions. They
never reconsidered their views. Only three did so and not on the same
occasion, showing no wholesale change of votes at any time.
Three. To flip-flop means to vote for one proposition at first (take
a stand), shift to the opposite proposition upon the second vote
(flip), and revert to his first position upon the third (flop). Not one
of the twenty-three Justices flipped-flopped in his vote.
Four. The three Justices who changed their votes did not do so in
one direction. Justice Velasco changed his vote from a vote to annul to
a vote to uphold; Justice Villarama from a vote to uphold to a vote to
annul; and Justice Mendoza from a vote to annul to a vote to uphold.
Not one of the three flipped-flopped since they never changed their
votes again afterwards.
Notably, no one can dispute the right of a judge, acting on a motion
for reconsideration, to change his mind regarding the case. The rules
are cognizant of the fact that human judges could err and that it would
merely be fair and right for them to correct their perceived errors upon
a motion for reconsideration. The three Justices who changed their
votes had the right to do so.
Five. Evidently, the voting was not a case of massive flip-flopping
by the Justices of the Court. Rather, it was a case of tiny shifts in
the votes, occasioned by the consistently slender margin that one view
held over the other. This reflected the nearly even soundness of the
opposing advocacies of the contending sides.
Six. It did not help that in one year alone in 2009, seven Justices
retired and were replaced by an equal number. It is such that the
resulting change in the combinations of minds produced multiple shifts
in the outcomes of the voting. No law or rule requires succeeding
Justices to adopt the views of their predecessors. Indeed, preordained
conformity is anathema to a democratic system.
9. Complainants allege in pars. 3.4, 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4,
3.4.5, 3.4.6, 3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.4.9 and 3.4.10 that CJ Corona compromised
his independence when his wife accepted an appointment from Mrs. Arroyo
to the Board of John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC). JHMC is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA), a government-owned and controlled corporation. Complainants
claim that the appointment of Mrs. Corona was meant to secure CJ
Corona’s loyalty and vote in the Supreme Court.
10. The truth of the matter is that Mrs. Corona was named to the
JHMC on 19 April 2001, even before CJ Corona joined the Supreme Court.
Her appointment did not in any way influence the voting of CJ Corona
when he eventually joined the Court. No law prohibits the wife of a
Chief Justice from pursuing her own career in the government. This is
commonplace. Indeed, Article 73 of the Family Code explicitly allows
the wife to exercise any legitimate profession, business, or activity
even without the consent of the husband.
11. The Constitution provides that “the State recognizes the role
of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.” Further, the State is called on to
provide women with “opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation.”
12. Complainants allege that complaints have been filed against
Mrs. Corona by disgruntled members of the Board of JHMC and certain
officers and employees. This is not the forum for hearing and deciding
those complaints. Mrs. Corona has adequately answered and is prepared
to face her accusers before the appropriate forum. Surely, CJ Corona is
not being impeached for alleged offenses of his wife.
13. Complainants also allege that CJ Corona used court funds for
personal expenses. Complainants summed this up in their general
allegations as “petty graft and corruption for his personal profit and
convenience.”
14. CJ Corona denies these unspecified allegations. They are
untrue and unfounded. Complainants are desperate to demonstrate some
reason to believe that CJ Corona has committed acts constituting
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, or
graft and corruption.
15. Complainants next allege in pars. 3.5. 3.5.2, 3.5.4, 3.5.5,
3.5.6, 3.5.8, 3.5.9, 3.5.10 and 3.5.11 that CJ Corona improperly
entertained Lauro Vizconde who had a case pending before the Supreme
Court. In truth, only Dante Jimenez, as head of the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption (VACC) was cleared to make a courtesy call on the
newly appointed Chief Justice. CJ Corona was thus surprised to see
Lauro Vizconde come into his chambers with Jimenez. It is regrettable
that Lauro Vizconde remained during the meeting, rest assured, however,
that this is a result of etiquette and manners, and not any evil
intention to connive or commit any act in violation of ethical norms.
16. It is not true that CJ Corona told Vizconde and Jimenez that
Justice Carpio was lobbying for accused Hubert Webb’s acquittal.
Firstly, the Chief Justice had no basis for saying this. Secondly, he
does not discuss pending cases with anyone. Thirdly, research will show
a report taken from the Philippine News dated 23 February 2011 which
says that both CJ Corona and Lauro Vizconde were warned in 2006 by a
Court of Appeals Justice about someone lobbying for acquittal in the
Hubert Webb case. As CJ Corona recalls it now, it was Jimenez and
Vizconde who initiated the discussion complaining about Justice Carpio’s
alleged maneuvers in the case.
17. The Complainants resurrect the old charge that Fernando Campos
raised against CJ Corona in connection with the Supreme Court’s action
in Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation v. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Campos claimed that CJ Corona dismissed the case with undue
haste, impropriety, and irregularity. Unfortunately, Campos did not
say that the Supreme Court dismissed his petition by minute resolution
because he erroneously appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Supreme
Court instead of the Court of Appeals and because he failed to show that
the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case
against his company.
18. Complainants are evidently unfamiliar with Supreme Court
procedure. The Supreme Court often dismisses unmeritorious cases by
minute resolution the first time it is reported and deliberated on, a
well-established practice necessitated by the volume of cases the
Supreme Court receives every day from all over the country. And
although the case has been assigned to CJ Corona as the
Member-in-Charge, the Division to which he was assigned fully
deliberated on its merits notwithstanding that its action was covered
which resulted in a minute resolution.
19. Further, except for saying that he had heard about it, Campos
has never been able to substantiate his charge that CJ Corona privately
met with the adverse party’s counsel in connection with the case. His
allegation is pure hearsay and speculation, hardly a ground for
impeachment.
20. True, in refuting Campos’ claim, CJ Corona wrote the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) stating that it was Campos who pestered him
through calls made by different people on his behalf. According to
Complainants, this is an admission that various persons were able to
communicate with CJ Corona in an attempt to influence him in the case.
CJ Corona, they allege, should have taken these people to task for
trying to influence a magistrate of the Supreme Court by filing
administrative charges against them.
21. No breach of ethical duties, much less an impeachable offense,
is committed when a magistrate ignores attempts to influence him.
ARTICLE IV
Alleged Disregard of the Principle of Separation
of Powers In Ombudsman Gutierrez’s case
Alleged Disregard of the Principle of Separation
of Powers In Ombudsman Gutierrez’s case
1. CJ Corona denies Article IV.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, that CJ Corona
is responsible for the Supreme Court en banc hastily issuing an SQAO
over the impeachment proceedings of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez,
revealing his high-handedness and partisanship.
3. The allegation is unfounded.
4. There was no “undue haste.” Section 2 (c), Rule 11, of the
Supreme Court’s Internal Rules authorizes prompt inclusion of a petition
in the Supreme Court’s agenda where a party seeks the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ, viz.:
(c) petitions under Rules 45, 64, and 65 – within ten days, unless a
party asks for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ,
and the Chief Justice authorizes the holding of a special raffle and the
immediate inclusion of the case in the Agenda * * *
5. Complainants rely on Justice Maria Lourdes’s separate opinion
that “several members of the Court * * had not yet then received a copy
of the Petition,” hence, no genuinely informed debate could be had.
6. The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court do not require copies
to be furnished to all members when the petition has been identified as
urgent. Section 6 (d), Rule 7 of the Internal Rules of Court merely
provide that copies of urgent petitions are furnished to the
Member-in-Charge and the Chief Justice, viz.:
SEC. 6. Special raffle of cases. – Should an initiatory pleading pray
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or an urgent and
extraordinary writ such as the writ of habeas corpus or of amparo, and
the case cannot be included in the regular raffle, the Clerk of Court
shall immediately call the attention of the Chief Justice or, in the
latter’s absence, the most senior Member of the Court present. The Chief
Justice or the Senior Member of the Court may direct the conduct of a
special raffle, in accordance with the following procedure:
* * *
(d) The Clerk of Court shall furnish the Member-in-Charge to whom the
case is raffled, the Judicial Records Office, and the Rollo Room at the
Office of the Chief Justice, copies of the result of the special raffle
in an envelope marked “RUSH.” The Member-in-Charge shall also be
furnished a copy of the pleading. If the case is classified as a
Division case, the Clerk of Court shall furnish the same copies to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Division to which the same
Member-in-Charge belongs and to the Division Chairperson.
7. Although some Justices may not have received copies of the
petition, the Member-in-Charge of the case prepared and furnished the
other Justices copies of a detailed report on the petition and
recommending the issuance of a TRO. This reporting of cases is a
practice provided for in the Supreme Court’s Internal Rules. Sections 3
(a), (b), and (c) make reference to reports by a Member-in-Charge, viz.:
SEC. 3. Actions and decisions, how reached. – The actions and
decisions of the Court whether en banc or through a Division, shall be
arrived at as follows:
Initial action on the petition or complaint. – After a petition or
complaint has been placed on the agenda for the first time, the
Member-in-Charge shall, except in urgent cases, submit to the other
Members at least three days before the initial deliberation in such
case, a summary of facts, the issue or issues involved, and the
arguments that the petitioner presents in support of his or her case.
The Court shall, in consultation with its Members, decide on what action
it will take.
Action on incidents. – The Member-in-Charge shall recommend to the
Court the action to be taken on any incident during the pendency of the
case.
(c) Decision or Resolution. – When a case is submitted for decision
or resolution, the Member-in-Charge shall have the same placed in the
agenda of the Court for deliberation. He or she shall submit to the
other Members of the Court, at least seven days in advance, a report
that shall contain the facts, the issue or issues involved, the
arguments of the contending parties, and the laws and jurisprudence that
can aid the Court in deciding or resolving the case. In consultation,
the Members of the Court shall agree on the conclusion or conclusions in
the case, unless the said Member requests a continuance and the Court
grants it.
8. The Justices deliberated the case at length. Only after every
one who wanted to speak had done so did the Justices agree to take a
vote. It was at this point that the Supreme Court issued the SQAO.
9. Although a Member-in-Charge is authorized by the Rules of Court
to issue the preliminary injunction on his own, this has never been
the practice in the Supreme Court.
10. Complainants allege that, in issuing the SQAO, the Supreme
Court headed by CJ Corona violated the principle of separation of
powers. This principle is not absolute. The Constitution precisely
grants the Supreme Court the power to determine whether the House of
Representatives gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in the exercise of its functions. Precisely, section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied.)
11. The Gutierrez petition posed a significant constitutional
issue: whether the ban against more than one impeachment complaint
within a year provided in Section 3 (5), Article XI of the Constitution
had been violated. The Supreme Court issued the SQAO to prevent the
petition from being rendered moot and academic.
12. Actually, this is not a novel issue. In Francisco v. House of
Representatives the Supreme Court reviewed compliance with
Constitutional procedure in impeachment proceedings. Thus, CJ Corona
cannot be held liable for actions of the Supreme Court.
ARTICLE V
Alleged Disregard of Principle of Res Judicata
By Reviving Final and Executory Decisions
Alleged Disregard of Principle of Res Judicata
By Reviving Final and Executory Decisions
1. CJ Corona denies Article V.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9,
5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 that CJ Corona failed to
maintain the principle of immutability of final judgments in three
cases: League of Cities v. COMELEC, Navarro v. Ermita, and FASAP v.
Philippine Air Lines. The succeeding discussion will demonstrate that
these allegations are false and misleading.
3. The League of Cities Case has been decided by the Supreme Court
with finality. For this reason, Complainants cannot have this
Impeachment Court review the correctness of this decision without
encroaching on the judicial power of the Supreme Court. As earlier
argued, Maglasang v. People states the rule that no branch of government
may pass upon judgments of the Supreme Court or declare them unjust.
4. The above principle dictates that grounds for impeachment
cannot involve questions on the correctness of decisions of the Supreme
Court.
5. Complainants fault CJ Corona for entertaining prohibited
pleadings such as the letters to the Chief Justice in the League of
Cities Case. These letters were received on 19 January 2009, more than a
year before CJ Corona assumed office. Besides, CJ Corona was merely
furnished copies of the letters as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court.
6. The letters merely requested the participation of the Justices
who previously took no part in the case. They were treated as motions
upon which the opposing party was required to comment.
7. CJ Corona never flip-flopped on his votes, voting consistently,
in favor of the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws.
8. The letters did not bring about a flip-flop in the case. In
fact, the Resolutions of the Supreme Court dated 31 March 2009 and 28
April 2009, upheld the earlier Decision of 18 November 2008.
9. Contrary to the allegation in the Complaint, the decision of 18
November 2008 did not attain finality on 21 May 2009. The entry of
judgment made on said date was recalled by the Supreme Court.
10. The recall of entries of judgment, while extraordinary, is not
novel. The Supreme Court has issued such resolutions in cases, under
specified and narrow limits, such as Gunay v. Court of Appeals; Manotok
v. Barque; Advincula v. Intermediate Appellate Court; and People v.
Chavez.
11. Because the Entry of Judgment of 21 May 2011 was premature,
the Decision of 18 November 2008 did not attain finality and the
principle of res judicata cannot apply. Indeed, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents was declared not a prohibited
pleading in a Resolution dated 2 June 2009 penned by Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, thus:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that: “No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” Thus, a
decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion
for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows
the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the
second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed
the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second
motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However,
for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second
motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution. (Emphasis
supplied)
11. Second motions for reconsideration have been allowed for the
purpose of rectifying error in the past, see for reference, Ocampo v.
Bibat-Palamos; Sta. Rosa Realty v. Amante; Millares v. NLRC; Soria v.
Villegas; Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines; Manotok v. Barque; Galman
v. Sandiganbayan; and In re: Republic v. Co Keng.
12. According to Poliand v. National Development Company, a
subsequent motion for reconsideration is not a second motion for
reconsideration if it seeks the review of a new resolution which “delves
for the first time” on a certain issue:
Ordinarily, no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Essentially,
however, the instant motion is not a second motion for reconsideration
since the viable relief it seeks calls for the review, not of the
Decision dated August 22, 2005, but the November 23, 2005 Resolution
which delved for the first time on the issue of the reckoning date of
the computation of interest. In resolving the instant motion, the Court
will be reverting to the Decision dated August 22, 2005. In so doing,
the Court will be shunning further delay so as to ensure that finis is
written to this controversy and the adjudication of this case attains
finality at the earliest possible time as it should.” (Emphasis
supplied)
13. Based on Poliand, the subsequent pleadings filed by the
respondents were not second, third or fourth motions for
reconsideration.
14. Thus, CJ Corona may not be held liable due to the granting of a
second motion for reconsideration as this would amount to an
unwarranted review of a collegial action of the Supreme Court.
15. The other two cases—Navarro and FASAP—have not yet been
decided with finality since they are still subject of unresolved motions
for reconsideration. Consequently, it would be inappropriate and
unethical for the Chief Justice to dwell on their merits in this Answer.
16. Besides, it would also be unfair, improper, and premature for
the Impeachment Court to discuss the merits of these two cases since
such could very well influence the result of the case pending with the
Supreme Court. At any rate, if the Impeachment Court decides to look
into these two cases, then it may have to give the parties to the case
the opportunity to be heard. This would amount to an attempt to
exercise judicial power.
17. For the above reasons, CJ Corona cannot make any comment on
the Navarro and FASAP Cases, for he would be required to take a stand on
the issues. It will be recalled that he inhibited in FASAP. In
Navarro, he is likewise prohibited from making any comment as it is
still sub-judice.
ARTICLE VI
Alleged Improper Creation of the
Supreme Court Ethics Committee
Alleged Improper Creation of the
Supreme Court Ethics Committee
1. CJ Corona denies Article VI.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 that CJ Corona
betrayed public trust when “he created” the Supreme Court’s Ethics
Committee purposely to investigate and exonerate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, the ponente in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary who was charged
with plagiarism. Allegedly, the CJ encroached on the power of the House
to impeach and of the Senate to try the Justices of the Supreme Court.
3. The truth of the matter is that, CJ Corona did not create the
Ethics Committee. It was the Supreme Court en banc, during the tenure
of Chief Justice S. Reynato Puno, that unanimously approved A.M. No.
10-4-20-SC, creating the Ethics Committee. Rule 2, Section 13 of the
Internal Rules provide:
SEC. 13. Ethics Committee. – In addition to the above, a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards shall be established and
chaired by the Chief Justice, with the following membership:
a working Vice-Chair appointed by the Chief Justice;
three (3) members chosen among themselves by the en banc by secret vote; and
a retired Supreme Court Justice chosen by the chief Justice as a non-voting observer-consultant.
The Vice-Chair, the Members and the retired Supreme Court Justice
shall serve for a term of one (1) year, with the election in case of
elected Members to be held at the call of the Chief Justice.
* * *
4. The Supreme Court’s Internal Rules provide that the Ethics
Committee “shall have the task of preliminarily investigating all
Complaints involving graft and corruption and violation of ethical
standards, including anonymous Complaints, filed against Members of the
Supreme Court, and of submitting findings and recommendations to the
Supreme Court en banc.”
5. Since the Supreme Court approved its Internal Rules that
created the Ethics Committee long before Justice Del Castillo was
charged with plagiarism, it cannot be said that CJ Corona created the
Committee purposely to exonerate him.
6. Contrary to Complainants’ claim, it was the Supreme Court en
banc that referred his case to the Ethics Committee. Notably, the
members of the Ethics Committee were elected through secret balloting by
the members of the Supreme Court en banc.
7. After hearing the parties on their evidence, the Ethics
Committee unanimously recommended to the Supreme Court en banc the
dismissal of the charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. The
Supreme Court en banc absolved him on a 10-2 vote, and subsequently
voted 11-3 to deny the motion for reconsideration filed in the case. CJ
Corona cast but one vote in both instances with the majority.
8. The creation of the Ethics Committee by the Supreme Court
cannot be regarded as an act of betrayal of public trust. The power to
promulgate Internal Rules and create the Ethics Committee stems from the
power of the Supreme Court to discipline its own members as provided
for in Section 6 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
9. The Committee’s power is only recommendatory. If the offense is
impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc will refer the matter to the
House of Representatives for investigation. On the other hand, if the
offense is non-impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc may decide the
case and, if warranted, impose administrative sanctions against the
offender.
10. Actually, disciplining members of the Supreme Court is not a
new development. The Supreme Court en banc investigated then censured
Associate Justice Fidel Purisima in 2002 for failing to disclose on time
his relationship to a bar examinee and for breach of duty and
confidence. The Supreme Court also forfeited fifty percent of the fee
due him as Chairman of the 1999 Bar Examinations Committee.
11. In 2003, the Supreme Court en banc empowered a committee
consisting of some of its members to investigate Justice Jose C. Vitug
as a possible source of leakage in the 2003 bar exams in Mercantile
Law. The Supreme Court eventually absolved Justice Vitug of any
liability for that leakage.
12. Lastly, on 24 February 2008 the Supreme Court en banc created a
committee to investigate the charge that Justice Ruben Reyes leaked a
confidential internal document of the Supreme Court to one of the
parties to a case pending before it. The Supreme Court, acting on the
findings of the committee, found Justice Reyes guilty of grave
misconduct, imposed on him a fine of P500,000.00 and disqualified him
from holding any office or employment in the government.
ARTICLE VII
Alleged Improper Issuance of TRO to Allow
President GMA and Husband to Flee the Country
Alleged Improper Issuance of TRO to Allow
President GMA and Husband to Flee the Country
1. CJ Corona denies Article VII.
2. Complainants allege in pars. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.7, 7.8,
7.9, and 7.10 that the Supreme Court under CJ Corona inexplicably
consolidated the separate petitions of GMA and her husband Jose Miguel
Arroyo to give undue advantage to the latter, since the urgent health
needs of GMA would then be extended to him.
3. The consolidation of actions has always been addressed to the
sound discretion of the court where they have been filed. Section 1 of
Rule 31 provides that when actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order the actions
consolidated. The Supreme Court’s own Internal Rules provide for in
Section 5, Rule 9, consolidation in proper cases, thus:
SEC. 5. Consolidation of cases. – The Court may order the consolidation of cases involving common questions of law or of fact.
4. In the Arroyo petitions, the Supreme Court en banc unanimously
ordered the consolidation of their petitions since they involved common
questions of fact and law. In both petitions, the principal issue is
whether the Secretary of Justice has violated their Constitutional right
to travel by issuing a WLO, preventing them from leaving the country.
5. Once more, the consolidation was a unanimous collegial action
of the Supreme Court en banc. It would be unfair to subject CJ Corona
to impeachment for consolidating these petitions, without impleading all
the members of the Supreme Court.
6. Complainants allege in par. 7.2 that the Supreme Court under CJ
Corona hastily granted the TRO to allow GMA and her husband to leave
the country despite certain inconsistencies in the petition and doubts
regarding the state of her health. Further, Complainants assail par.
7.3 the propriety of the issuance of the TRO, despite the
Member-in-Charge’s recommendation to hold a hearing first.
7. The Supreme Court en banc did not act with undue haste. The
members were given copies of the petitions of GMA and her husband. The
deliberation on the matter took long because many of the Justices
presented their separate views. Only then did the Justices decide to
submit the matter to a vote. The majority opted to issue a TRO,
enjoining the Secretary of Justice from enforcing her WLO against the
Arroyos.
8. Complainants lament that the Supreme Court en banc acted on the
applications for TRO despite the Member-in-Charge’s recommendation that
the en banc first hold a hearing on the matter. But, firstly, the
Supreme Court en banc is not bound by the Member-in-Charge’s
recommendation. As in any collegial body, the decision of the majority
prevails, consistent with democratic processes, over the opposite view
of the minority.
9. Significantly, the Office Solicitor General (OSG) filed
separate manifestations and motions in the two cases, seeking deferment
of court action on the applications for the TRO. If these were not
granted, the OSG alternatively asked the Supreme Court to consider the
arguments presented in those manifestations and motions as its
opposition to the TRO. The Supreme Court en banc did so. Consequently,
Complainants cannot conclude that the Supreme Court en banc denied the
government its opportunity to be heard.
10. Complainants allege in par. 7.4 that the Supreme Court
extended its office hours to allow the Arroyos to post bond and
instructed its process servers to serve copies of its order on the DOJ
and the OSG. Complainants also point out that the Supreme Court was
coordinating with the Arroyos who made multiple flight bookings in
expectation of the issuance of the TRO.
11. CJ Corona denies that any such coordination took place.
Information that the Supreme Court en banc would be taking up those TRO
applications on the morning of 15 November 2011 was widely known.
Indeed, crews of all major television stations and print reporters had
been camping at the gates of the Supreme Court that very morning. It is
not surprising that the Arroyos and their lawyers apparently prepared
for the chance that the Supreme Court might favorably act on their
applications for TRO and so, had their plans in place.
12. Section 8, Rule 11, of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, provides that resolutions granting applications for temporary
restraining orders are to be released immediately. The ruling of the
Supreme Court en banc was announced after lunch. The Arroyos got their
copies of the resolution and demanded that the same be served
immediately on the Government invoking the Internal Rules. The courts
and all law practitioners know that demanding immediate service of TROs
is common in urgent cases. The Supreme Court and the Chief Justice had
no knowledge of or interest in the flight bookings of the Arroyos.
Similarly, the Supreme Court is unaware of the acts of the Arroyos or
their counsel apart from what they state in their pleadings and
submissions.
13. At any rate, a warrant of arrest was issued in the electoral
sabotage case before the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC) and GMA
is presently detained. The question pertaining to the WLO issued under
DOJ Circular No. 41 remains. As earlier stated, CJ Corona cannot
discuss matters which are sub-judice.
14. In any event, CJ Corona– as repeatedly stated– cannot be held
liable for a collegial action such as the issuance of the TRO in the
Arroyo petitions.
15. Complainants aver in par. 7.5 that CJ Corona allowed the
issuance of the TRO despite the Arroyos’ failure to appoint a legal
representative who will receive subpoenae, orders, and other legal
processes on their behalf during their absence –one of the conditions to
be fulfilled within five days, as stated by the Supreme Court in the
TRO.
16. While the Arroyos immediately posted the required bond, the
Special Power of Attorney they submitted to the Clerk of Court lacked
the required authority of their representative to receive subpoenae,
orders, and other legal processes on their behalf.
17. Complainants rely on Justice Sereno’s dissenting opinion of 18
November 2011 that the TRO was “suspended until there is compliance
with such condition.” The Supreme Court, however ruled otherwise since
the TRO was expressly made “immediately executory.” The Arroyos
rectified their defective Special Power of Attorney before the five-day
period lapsed.
18. The Supreme Court en banc took a vote on whether the
deficiency in the special power of attorney suspended the TRO. The
majority ruled by a 9-4 vote that the TRO remained in force, because the
conditions were resolutory, and not suspensive as suggested by Justice
Sereno in her dissent. In other words, the TRO will remain executory
(i.e., in force), but if the conditions were not fulfilled within five
days, the TRO would be lifted. There are several cases where the
Supreme Court ruled that a TRO is effective even prior to the posting of
a bond.
19. This establishes the falsity of the allegation in par. 7.9
that CJ Corona “did not correct the decision * * (because it) did not
reflect the agreement and decision made by the Supreme Court during
their deliberations on November 18, 2011” and that he “subverted the
will of the Supreme Court and imposed his unilateral will by making it
likewise appear that the TRO was effective despite non-compliance with
his own imposed pre-condition.”
20. Plainly, CJ Corona cannot unilaterally correct a decision of
the Supreme Court. The decision correctly reflects the outcome of the
Supreme Court’s deliberations on 18 November 2011. More importantly,
the opinion of Justice Sereno is a mere dissent, and is not the
controlling opinion; it is just her opinion.
21. The allegation in par. 7.10 that CJ Corona “knowingly fed”
Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez “the wrong sense and import of
the deliberations of the Court on the TRO issue” is likewise untrue.
22. As in previous allegations, CJ Corona is constrained to repeat
that he cannot be held liable for the acts of the Supreme Court. If
any, this Impeachment Court must confine its inquiry into whether the
questioned actions were reached in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
ARTICLE VIII
Alleged Failure to Account for JDF and SAJ Funds
Alleged Failure to Account for JDF and SAJ Funds
CJ Corona denies Article VIII.
2. Complainants allege pars. 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 that CJ Corona
betrayed the public trust and/or committed graft and corruption when he
failed and refused (i) to report on the status of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary
(SAJ); (ii) to remit to the Bureau of Treasury all SAJ collections; and
(iii) to account for funds released and spent for unfilled positions in
Judiciary and from authorized and funded, but not created courts.
3. The allegations in Article VIII demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of the laws governing the JDF and SAJ.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the Legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the Legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
4. These allegations in Article VIII are a mere rehash of the
allegations against former Chief Justices Andres Narvasa and Hilario
Davide, Jr. Secretary Florencio Abad has adamantly sought and continues
to seek control of the budget allocated for the unfilled positions for
the Legislative Department, the Judiciary and the constitutional
commissions. This is an attack on the Supreme Court’s fiscal autonomy.
5. Before moving forward, CJ Corona states categorically that all
disbursement vouchers for the funds of the JDF and SAJ are submitted to
the resident COA auditor, who passes upon them in post-audit.
6. The JDF was established by P.D. 1949 for the benefit of the
members and personnel of the Judiciary, to help guarantee its
independence as mandated by the Constitution, and required for the
independent administration of justice:
Section 1. There is hereby established a Judiciary Development Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund for the benefit of the members and
personnel of the Judiciary to help ensure and guarantee the independence
of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy and
required by the impartial administration of justice. The Fund shall be
derived from, among others, the increase in the legal fees prescribed in
the amendments to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to be promulgated by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Fund shall be used to augment
the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to
finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and
facilities; Provided, That at least eighty percent (80%) of the Fund
shall be used for cost of living allowances, and not more than twenty
percent (20%) of the said Fund shall be used for office equipment and
facilities of the Courts located where the legal fees are collected;
Provided, further, That said allowances of the members and personnel of
the Judiciary shall be distributed in proportion of their basic
salaries; and, Provided, finally, That bigger allowances may be granted
to those receiving a basic salary of less than P1,000.00 a month.
7. It is untrue that CJ Corona failed or refused to report on the
status of the JDF and the SAJ collections. The truth is that the DBM, on
12 December 2011, was furnished with the Court’s latest JDF Quarterly
Report of Deposits and Disbursements (as of 30 September 2011), the JDF
Monthly Report of Deposits and Disbursements (for the periods of July to
30 September 2011), the SAJ Quarterly Report of Deposits and
Disbursements (as of 30 September 2011) and the SAJ Monthly Report of
Deposits and Disbursements (for the periods of July to 30 September
2011); on 9 September 2011, the Supreme Court’s JDF Schedule of
Collections and Disbursements from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010
and 1 January 2011 to 30 June 2011; on 8 September 2011, pertinent
documents on the SAJ fund, particularly the list of actual number of
filled positions and their corresponding basic monthly salaries,
including salary increases and the monthly SAJ of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and the
Lower Court, and the financial reports on the SAJ Schedule of
Collections and Disbursements from 1 January 2010 to December 2010 and 1
January 2011 to 30 June 2011. In fine, there has been no failure or
refusal whatever to report the status of these funds.
8. Various reports on the collections and disbursements on the JDF
and the SAJ Fund were likewise subimtted to the COA, the Senate, and
the House of Representatives. Additionally, bank reconciliation
statements, trial balances, and other financial reports on the JDF and
the SAJ Fund were submitted to the COA.
9. There are various reports, among many others, submitted to
Congress and other agencies of government that debunk the claim of
non-reporting: (1) Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances
(SAOB) for 2010, reflecting the realignment of savings from the regular
appropriations of the Supreme Court, to the DBM; (2) Reports of
Collections and Disbursements on the JDF and the SAJ Fund to the COA,
the DBM, the House of Representatives, and the Senate; and (3) Reports
of Collections and Disbursements on the Fiduciary Fund to the Senate,
and the utilization of savings for the years 2008 and 2009 to the
Senate.
10. Contrary to the allegations of Complainants, CJ Corona has no
duty to remit all SAJ collections to the Bureau of Treasury. R.A. 9227
gives the Judiciary exclusive control over the SAJ and, for this reason,
these collections do not accrue to the General Fund of the national
government. This is further buttressed by a memorandum jointly executed
by the Supreme Court and the Department of Budget and Management which
provides:
2.2 Effective immediately, collection of the judiciary from funds
enumerated under items 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above shall no longer be remitted
to the National Treasury. Instead, these shall be deposited in a
authorized government depository bank as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
* * *
11. Items 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 adverted above refer to sources of the SAJ.
12. CJ Corona reiterates that raising anew before the Impeachment
Court the issue of non-remittance by the Supreme Court of the JDF and
SAJ to the national coffers is another attempt to circumvent the fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court. In the resolution dated 18 January 2011,
the Supreme Court resolved, among others, that interests on deposits, of
JDF shall not be remitted to the National Treasury.
13. As for the third allegation of failure to account for funds
for unfilled positions, the Supreme Court, through its Fiscal Management
and Budget Office (FMBO), submitted to the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) the Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances
(SAOB) for 2010, reflecting the realignment of savings from the regular
appropriations of the Supreme Court. The utilization of savings from
the years 2008 and 2009 were also previously submitted to the Senate in
connection with the 2011 budget hearings.
14. Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, authorizes the Chief Justice to realign savings from appropriations, thus:
Sec. 25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; However, the President, the President of the Senate, The
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. (Emphasis supplied)
15. Consequently, the yearly General Appropriations Act, including
that for fiscal year 2010, provides a similar provision on the Chief
Justice’s power to augment, i.e., the use of savings, thus:
Sec. 60. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 60. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (Emphasis supplied)
16. Complainants allege in par. 8.3 that CJ Corona is liable for
failing or refusing to remit fiduciary funds in the amount of P5.38
Billion, as well as the alleged misstated balance of the special
allowance for the judiciary, in the amount of P559.5 Million. The
allegation is absurd, the truth of the matter being that the fiduciary
funds and the misstated balance were all accumulated long before the
tenure of CJ Corona. In any case, all these matters were reported and
disclosed to Congress as far back as 2010.
17. The P5.38 Billion pertains to the Trust Fund accounts and the
Philippine Mediation Center trust receipts. At the time of the audit
observation in 2009, A.M. No. 05-3-35-SC (Re: Audit Observation
Memorandum) and A.M. No. 10-8-3-SC (Re: Fiduciary Fund Deposits Not
Remitted to the Bureau of Treasury) were still pending and the matter of
the nature of the judiciary funds was yet to be resolved. It is unfair,
unjust and unreasonable to make CJ Corona responsible for actions
before his term. As of the promulgation of the resolutions above on 18
January 2011, CJ Corona—by decision of the Supreme Court—need not remit
unclaimed fiduciary funds of private parties, including interest, until a
law is passed authorizing the escheat or forfeiture of such unclaimed
funds in favor of the state.
18. The resolutions also provide, however, that funds paid to guarantee undertakings in favor of the government, and interest thereon, are income of the government and shall be remitted to the National Treasury.
18. The resolutions also provide, however, that funds paid to guarantee undertakings in favor of the government, and interest thereon, are income of the government and shall be remitted to the National Treasury.
19. On the matter of the P559.5 Million, it should be reiterated
that as early as December 2010, the Supreme Court already furnished the
Commission on Audit (COA) with a report on the status of the
implementation of said audit recommendation. Thus, as per report
submitted to the COA, the Supreme Court stated that the bank
reconciliation statements of the different accounts have already been
finished as of 31 December 2009, and the Supreme Court was simply
awaiting further action from the COA before it can fully correct and
reconcile the differences due to closed accounts and negative balances
in the Court’s books of accounts.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona respectfully prays for the
outright dismissal of the “Verified Impeachment Complaint,” for failing
to meet the requirements of the Constitution, or that the Impeachment
Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the Articles of Impeachment.
Chief Justice Corona likewise prays for all other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
Chief Justice Corona likewise prays for all other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
Manila for Pasay City, Wednesday, 21 December 2011.
Respectfully submitted by
Counsel for Chief Justice Renato C. Corona:
Counsel for Chief Justice Renato C. Corona:
JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (RET.)
PTR No. 2643828, January 4, 2011, Makati
IBP No. 846915 issued January 6, 2011, Manila I
Roll no. 3814
MCLE-exempt
PTR No. 2643828, January 4, 2011, Makati
IBP No. 846915 issued January 6, 2011, Manila I
Roll no. 3814
MCLE-exempt
JOSE M. ROY III
PTR No. 2643183; 1/04/11; Makati City
IBP LRN 02570 August 20, 2001 (Lifetime)
Roll of Attorneys No. 37065
MCLE Exemption No. I-000176
PTR No. 2643183; 1/04/11; Makati City
IBP LRN 02570 August 20, 2001 (Lifetime)
Roll of Attorneys No. 37065
MCLE Exemption No. I-000176
JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
PTR NO. 2642896, 4 January 2011, Makati City
IBP LRN No. 01668 (Lifetime)
Roll of Attorneys No. 22495
MCLE Exemption No. III-00832-March 8, 2010
PTR NO. 2642896, 4 January 2011, Makati City
IBP LRN No. 01668 (Lifetime)
Roll of Attorneys No. 22495
MCLE Exemption No. III-00832-March 8, 2010
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
PTR No. 11142346; Imus, Cavite: 1-4-2011
IBP No. 830009; Cavite; 1-3-2011
Roll of Attorneys No. 36540
MCLE Compliance No. III-0014744; 4-27-2010
PTR No. 11142346; Imus, Cavite: 1-4-2011
IBP No. 830009; Cavite; 1-3-2011
Roll of Attorneys No. 36540
MCLE Compliance No. III-0014744; 4-27-2010
GERMAN Q. LICHAUCO II
PTR No. 2666945; 5 January 2011, Makati City
IBP No. 839397; 3 January 2011, Makati City
Roll No. 38552, 13 May 1993
MCLE Compliance No. III-0016294, 11 May 2010
PTR No. 2666945; 5 January 2011, Makati City
IBP No. 839397; 3 January 2011, Makati City
Roll No. 38552, 13 May 1993
MCLE Compliance No. III-0016294, 11 May 2010
DENNIS P. MANALO
PTR No. 2666920; 5 January 2011, Makati City
IBP No. 839371; 3 January 2011, Makati City
Roll No. 40950, 12 April 1996
MCLE Compliance No. III-0009471, 26 April 2010
PTR No. 2666920; 5 January 2011, Makati City
IBP No. 839371; 3 January 2011, Makati City
Roll No. 40950, 12 April 1996
MCLE Compliance No. III-0009471, 26 April 2010
Copies furnished:
House of Representatives
Batasan Complex
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Batasan Complex
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Senators of the Republic of the Philippines
GSIS Building
GSIS Building
See, Noynoy prefers to take oath before barangay chairman, HYPERLINK
“http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/190971/news/nation/noynoy-prefers-to-take-oath-before-barangay-chairman”http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/190971/news/nation/noynoy-prefers-to-take-oath-before-barangay-chairman,
14 May 2010 (last accessed 21 December 2011).
See, for reference, President Aquino’s speech at the justice summit, HYPERLINK “http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino%E2%80%99s-speech-at-the-justice-summit”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino’s-speech-at-the-justice-summit, 6 December 2011, and Aquino savages Corona at criminal justice summit, HYPERLINK “http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino%E2%80%99s-speech-at-the-justice-summit”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino’s-speech-at-the-justice-summit, 6 December 2011 (last accessed 21 December 2011).
G. R. No. 171101, 22 November 2011.
William H. Renhquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, 1992.
Sovereignty of the People, HYPERLINK “http://fatherbernasblogs.blogspot.com/” http://fatherbernasblogs.blogspot.com/, 10 December 2011 (last accessed 21 December 2011).
Complaint, pp. 8 and 9, respectively.
G. R. Nos. 191002, 191032, and 191057; A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC; G. R. Nos. 191149, 191342, and 191420, 17 March 2010.
Supra, at 4, pp. 8-11.
Supra, at 4, p. 10.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 11 Section 3(1).
These statements are easily gleaned from various interviews given by Representatives Tobias Tiangco, Hermenegildo Mandanas, Crispin Remulla, Rodolfo Fariñas, Rodolfo Biazon and, none other than the alleged editor, Niel Tupas, Jr., among others.
To name two, the Reproductive Health Bill and the Freedom of Information Act.
The role of the Liberal Party was admitted by President Aquino, Undersecretary Abigail Valte, Representative Niel Tupas, Speaker Feliciano F. Belmonte, among others.
The reservation of the right to request for compulsory processes refers to documents, witnesses and other sources of evidence to be identified and specified at the appropriate time.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003 ed., p. 1111.
Id.
G. R. No. L-7708, 30 May 1955.
G. R. No. L-27664, 18 February 1970.
A. M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-97-CA-J, 2 May 2006.
A. M. No. CA-09-47-J, 13 February 2009.
G. R. No. 90083, 4 October 1990.
G. R. No. L-68635, 12 March 1987.
A. M. No. 93-7-696-0, 21 February 1995.
G. R. Nos. 191002, 191032, and 191057; A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC; G. R. Nos. 191149, 191342, and 191420, 17 March 2010.
G. R. No. L-19313, 19 January 1962.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 November 1998.
Ibid, pp. 425-426.
Complaint, par. 1.14, page 8.
Id.
CJ Corona and Justices Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, and Perez submitted individual concurring opinions. Justices Carpio, Morales, Abad, and Sereno submitted individual dissenting opinions.
G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948. This case was also cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G. R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001: to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
See, for reference, President Aquino’s speech at the justice summit, HYPERLINK “http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino%E2%80%99s-speech-at-the-justice-summit”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino’s-speech-at-the-justice-summit, 6 December 2011, and Aquino savages Corona at criminal justice summit, HYPERLINK “http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino%E2%80%99s-speech-at-the-justice-summit”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/105931/president-aquino’s-speech-at-the-justice-summit, 6 December 2011 (last accessed 21 December 2011).
G. R. No. 171101, 22 November 2011.
William H. Renhquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson, 1992.
Sovereignty of the People, HYPERLINK “http://fatherbernasblogs.blogspot.com/” http://fatherbernasblogs.blogspot.com/, 10 December 2011 (last accessed 21 December 2011).
Complaint, pp. 8 and 9, respectively.
G. R. Nos. 191002, 191032, and 191057; A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC; G. R. Nos. 191149, 191342, and 191420, 17 March 2010.
Supra, at 4, pp. 8-11.
Supra, at 4, p. 10.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Article 11 Section 3(1).
These statements are easily gleaned from various interviews given by Representatives Tobias Tiangco, Hermenegildo Mandanas, Crispin Remulla, Rodolfo Fariñas, Rodolfo Biazon and, none other than the alleged editor, Niel Tupas, Jr., among others.
To name two, the Reproductive Health Bill and the Freedom of Information Act.
The role of the Liberal Party was admitted by President Aquino, Undersecretary Abigail Valte, Representative Niel Tupas, Speaker Feliciano F. Belmonte, among others.
The reservation of the right to request for compulsory processes refers to documents, witnesses and other sources of evidence to be identified and specified at the appropriate time.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003 ed., p. 1111.
Id.
G. R. No. L-7708, 30 May 1955.
G. R. No. L-27664, 18 February 1970.
A. M. OCA I.P.I. No. 06-97-CA-J, 2 May 2006.
A. M. No. CA-09-47-J, 13 February 2009.
G. R. No. 90083, 4 October 1990.
G. R. No. L-68635, 12 March 1987.
A. M. No. 93-7-696-0, 21 February 1995.
G. R. Nos. 191002, 191032, and 191057; A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC; G. R. Nos. 191149, 191342, and 191420, 17 March 2010.
G. R. No. L-19313, 19 January 1962.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 November 1998.
Ibid, pp. 425-426.
Complaint, par. 1.14, page 8.
Id.
CJ Corona and Justices Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, and Perez submitted individual concurring opinions. Justices Carpio, Morales, Abad, and Sereno submitted individual dissenting opinions.
G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948. This case was also cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G. R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001: to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
Section 17, Article XI, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
provides: A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice‑President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
R. A. 6713, Section 8.
This is a matter of record and may be verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of Court en banc, Supreme Court.
Section 8, R. A. 6713 provides: the Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
En Banc Resolution, Re: Request of Jose Alejandrino, 2 May 1989.
A. M. No. 92-9-851-RTC, 22 September 1992.
G. R. No. 178083, 2 October 2009, and A. M. No. 11-10-1-SC, 4 October 2011.
Justice Nachura belonged to the Third Division, when under applicable rules, jurisdiction over the case remained with his former Division. Shortly after, the Second Division sent out a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Mendoza filed in the case.
The Supreme Court en banc resolved to restore the status quo prior to the assignment controversy, recalled the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and ordered the re-raffle of the case among all the members of the Court for a new assignment.
G. R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, 28 June 2011.
Constitution, Section 14, Article II.
Constitution, Sec. 14, Article XIII.
Complaint, page 10.
G. R. No. 186711.
Concurring Opinion, G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 2, Rule 58.
G. R. 160261, 10 November 2003.
G. R. 176951, 177499, and 178056, 21 December 2009.
G. R. 180050, 12 April 2011, motion for reconsideration pending.
G. R. 178083, 22 July 2008, motion for reconsideration pending.
G. R. 90083, 4 October 1990.
Supra, at 20.
G. R. No. L-48934, 16 January 1979.
G. R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, 18 December 2008.
G. R. No. L-75310, 16 January 1987.
G.R. No. 140690, June 19, 2001.
Complaint, page 3.
A. M. No. MTJ-06-1655, 6 March 2007.
G. R. No. 112526, 16 March 2005.
G. R. No. 110524, 29 July 2002.
A. M. No. RTJ-03-1812, 18 November 2004.
G. R. No. 136100, 24 July 2000.
G. R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, 18 December 2008.
G. R. No. No. L-72670, 12 September 1986.
G. R. No. L-19829, 31 August 1970.
G. R. No. 143866 and 143877, 19 May 2006.
Supra, at note 47 and related text.
G. R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 13, Rule II.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 13, Rule II.
En Banc Resolution, 27 July 2010.
Composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, Justice Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro as working Vice-Chair, Justices Roberto A. Abad, Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza as members and Justice Jose C. Vitug (ret.) as Observer-Consultant.
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, together with Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Menoza voted to adopt the recommendations of the Ethics Committee while Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales joined Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Serreno in her dissent. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Disodado M. Peralta were on leave while Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo took no part in the deliberations.
The majority were Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, together with Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Menoza. Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales and Maria Lourdes P.A. Serreno dissented.
“The Supreme Court shall have administrative Supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof”.
Bar Matter No. 979, 10 December 2002.
Bar Matter No. 1222, 4 February 2004.
A. M. No. 09-2-19-SC, 24 February 2009.
A. M. No. 10-4-20-SC, 4 May 2010.
The conditions were: (1) posting a cash bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00; (2) appointing a common legal representative who will receive subpoenae, orders, and other legal processes; and (3) if there is a Philippine Embassy or Consulate, the petitioners shall inform the Embassy or Consulate in the place where they will be traveling, by personal appearance or by phone, of their whereabouts at all times.
See, Romeo D. Lonzanida v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 157236-45, 18 March 2003; Ariel De Guzman v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 159713, 30 September 2003; Enrique Magsaysay v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 161328, 10 February 2004; Rodolfo Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 161455, 17 February 2004; Luisito Cumigad v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 167314, 7 June 2005; Fe Sun et al. v. Mayor Oriculo Granada et al., G. R. No. 170495, 13 December 2005; G. R. No. 170678, 17 January 2006; Ingatun Istarul v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 170702, 17 January 2006; Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary Francisco Duque III, G. R. No. 173034, 15 August 2006; Ramon Torres v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 187956, 7 July 2009; Romeo Ramos v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 189052, 25 August 2009; and Merloi Lamasan Piccio v. Sergio Pelopero et al., G. R. No. 191884, 4 May 2010.
These are funds coming from Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and from increases in fees which may be imposed by the Supreme Court after R.A. 9227 takes effect.
Joint Circular No. 2004-1, 13 January 2011.
A. M. No. 05-3-35-SC and A. M. No. 10-8-3-SC, served personally on the President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management on 20 January 2011.
R. A. 6713, Section 8.
This is a matter of record and may be verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of Court en banc, Supreme Court.
Section 8, R. A. 6713 provides: the Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
En Banc Resolution, Re: Request of Jose Alejandrino, 2 May 1989.
A. M. No. 92-9-851-RTC, 22 September 1992.
G. R. No. 178083, 2 October 2009, and A. M. No. 11-10-1-SC, 4 October 2011.
Justice Nachura belonged to the Third Division, when under applicable rules, jurisdiction over the case remained with his former Division. Shortly after, the Second Division sent out a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration that Atty. Mendoza filed in the case.
The Supreme Court en banc resolved to restore the status quo prior to the assignment controversy, recalled the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and ordered the re-raffle of the case among all the members of the Court for a new assignment.
G. R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, 28 June 2011.
Constitution, Section 14, Article II.
Constitution, Sec. 14, Article XIII.
Complaint, page 10.
G. R. No. 186711.
Concurring Opinion, G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 2, Rule 58.
G. R. 160261, 10 November 2003.
G. R. 176951, 177499, and 178056, 21 December 2009.
G. R. 180050, 12 April 2011, motion for reconsideration pending.
G. R. 178083, 22 July 2008, motion for reconsideration pending.
G. R. 90083, 4 October 1990.
Supra, at 20.
G. R. No. L-48934, 16 January 1979.
G. R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, 18 December 2008.
G. R. No. L-75310, 16 January 1987.
G.R. No. 140690, June 19, 2001.
Complaint, page 3.
A. M. No. MTJ-06-1655, 6 March 2007.
G. R. No. 112526, 16 March 2005.
G. R. No. 110524, 29 July 2002.
A. M. No. RTJ-03-1812, 18 November 2004.
G. R. No. 136100, 24 July 2000.
G. R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, 18 December 2008.
G. R. No. No. L-72670, 12 September 1986.
G. R. No. L-19829, 31 August 1970.
G. R. No. 143866 and 143877, 19 May 2006.
Supra, at note 47 and related text.
G. R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 13, Rule II.
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Section 13, Rule II.
En Banc Resolution, 27 July 2010.
Composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, Justice Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro as working Vice-Chair, Justices Roberto A. Abad, Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Mendoza as members and Justice Jose C. Vitug (ret.) as Observer-Consultant.
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, together with Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Menoza voted to adopt the recommendations of the Ethics Committee while Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales joined Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Serreno in her dissent. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Disodado M. Peralta were on leave while Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo took no part in the deliberations.
The majority were Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, together with Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leornardo-de Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez and Jose C. Menoza. Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales and Maria Lourdes P.A. Serreno dissented.
“The Supreme Court shall have administrative Supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof”.
Bar Matter No. 979, 10 December 2002.
Bar Matter No. 1222, 4 February 2004.
A. M. No. 09-2-19-SC, 24 February 2009.
A. M. No. 10-4-20-SC, 4 May 2010.
The conditions were: (1) posting a cash bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00; (2) appointing a common legal representative who will receive subpoenae, orders, and other legal processes; and (3) if there is a Philippine Embassy or Consulate, the petitioners shall inform the Embassy or Consulate in the place where they will be traveling, by personal appearance or by phone, of their whereabouts at all times.
See, Romeo D. Lonzanida v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 157236-45, 18 March 2003; Ariel De Guzman v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 159713, 30 September 2003; Enrique Magsaysay v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 161328, 10 February 2004; Rodolfo Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 161455, 17 February 2004; Luisito Cumigad v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 167314, 7 June 2005; Fe Sun et al. v. Mayor Oriculo Granada et al., G. R. No. 170495, 13 December 2005; G. R. No. 170678, 17 January 2006; Ingatun Istarul v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 170702, 17 January 2006; Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary Francisco Duque III, G. R. No. 173034, 15 August 2006; Ramon Torres v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 187956, 7 July 2009; Romeo Ramos v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 189052, 25 August 2009; and Merloi Lamasan Piccio v. Sergio Pelopero et al., G. R. No. 191884, 4 May 2010.
These are funds coming from Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and from increases in fees which may be imposed by the Supreme Court after R.A. 9227 takes effect.
Joint Circular No. 2004-1, 13 January 2011.
A. M. No. 05-3-35-SC and A. M. No. 10-8-3-SC, served personally on the President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management on 20 January 2011.
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